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Abstract This paper investigates the potential for
consumer-facing innovations to contribute emission re-
ductions for limiting warming to 1.5 °C. First, we show
that global integrated assessment models which charac-
terise transformation pathways consistent with 1.5 °C
mitigation are limited in their ability to analyse the
emergence of novelty in energy end-use. Second, we
introduce concepts of disruptive innovation which can
be usefully applied to the challenge of 1.5 °Cmitigation.
Disruptive low-carbon innovations offer novel value
propositions to consumers and can transform markets
for energy-related goods and services while reducing
emissions. Third, we identify 99 potentially disruptive
low-carbon innovations relating to mobility, food, build-
ings and cities, and energy supply and distribution.
Examples at the fringes of current markets include car
clubs, mobility-as-a-service, prefabricated high-
efficiency retrofits, internet of things, and urban farm-
ing. Each of these offers an alternative to mainstream
consumer practices. Fourth, we assess the potential
emission reductions from subsets of these disruptive
low-carbon innovations using two methods: a survey
eliciting experts’ perceptions and a quantitative scaling-
up of evidence from early-adopting niches to matched
segments of the UK population. We conclude that dis-
ruptive low-carbon innovations which appeal to con-
sumers can help efforts to limit warming to 1.5 °C.
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Abbreviations
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Transformation pathways for 1.5 °C mitigation
The Paris Agreement on climate change stated an ob-
jective of ‘Holding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C’ (Article 2). The Paris Agreement
was ratified and came into force in November 2016.
To limit warming to 1.5 °C, global greenhouse gas
emissions must reduce to net zero around mid-century,
with residual emissions thereafter beingmore than offset
by sinks or negative emission technologies (Rogelj et al.
2015). This requires a very rapid and pervasive trans-
formation of the global energy system.
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Transformation pathways to achieve the 2 °C target
or the more stringent 1.5 °C ambition of the Paris
Agreement are quantified in detail by global integrated
assessment models. Process-based integrated assess-
ment models (hereafter ‘IAMs’) represent in some detail
the key biophysical and socioeconomic processes in
economic, energy, agricultural, forestry and other sys-
tems, as well as the impact of resulting emissions on the
climate system (Sathaye and Shukla 2013). Global
IAMs are commonly run over the remaining 80+ years
of the twenty-first century to quantify cumulative long-
term emissions and resulting warming outcomes. Con-
sequently, IAMs provide a unique analytical bridge
between global mean temperature rise, cumulative emis-
sion budgets, and detailed representations of energy-
system transformation. In this way, they enable tech-
nology, cost and policy assessments of transforma-
tion pathways consistent with the objectives of the
Paris Agreement.
The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) synthesised evi-
dence from 116 transformation pathways for limiting
warming to 2 °C quantified by over 10 global IAMs
(Clarke et al. 2014). Several ‘robust’ features of these
pathways were consistently identified by the IAMs as
integral to a 2 °C future: (1) The energy supply rapidly
decarbonises, including large-scale deployment of bio-
mass with carbon capture and storage (bioCCS) as a
negative emission technology; (2) energy end-use rap-
idly and pervasively electrifies, and economies continue
to become ever-more efficient; and (3) delaying concert-
ed global action increases costs and increases the diffi-
culty of meeting the 2 °C target.
Two global IAM studies published recently have
generated transformation pathways consistent with the
even more restrictive 1.5 °C emissions budget (Rogelj
et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2016). Additional insights on
1.5 °C mitigation beyond the robust findings on 2 °C
mitigation can be summarised as: ‘harder and faster’.
Particular emphasis is placed on energy end-use: ‘De-
mand-side emissions account for most of the additional
mitigation efforts for reaching the 1.5°C limit relative to
2°C pathways ... [because] in 2°C scenarios, freely
emitting fossil installations are already almost fully
eliminated from the power system by mid-century’
(p19–20, Luderer et al. 2016).
Reducing demand-side emissions combines four ef-
fects: (1) improving conversion efficiencies of end-use
technologies, (2) reducing losses from passive systems
(particularly heat loss in buildings), (iii) reducing activity
levels (e.g. passenger-kilometres of mobility, m2 of heat-
ed floorspace), and (4) changing the structure or mix of
activities towards less energy-intensive alternatives (e.g.
from driving private vehicles to cycling and walking).
Global IAMs privilege mitigation from technical effi-
ciency improvements (Table 17.11 in Riahi et al. 2012;
p29 in Luderer et al. 2016). Explicit representation of
end-use technologies and their passive systems in IAMs
is generally quite coarse—and necessarily so for parsi-
monious and tractable models trying to capture the entire
global energy system. End-use technologies are smaller
in scale, orders of magnitude larger in number, more
dispersed, and highly heterogeneous compared with the
pits, pipelines and power plants of the energy supply
(Wilson et al. 2012). Many end-use technologies are also
consumer goods with a variety of attributes over which
end-user preferences vary (Mundaca et al. 2010). Energy
efficiency may be traded off against style, speed, safety,
size and status. These ‘behavioural’ characteristics of
end-use technology adoption pose problems for
modellers needing reduced form and context-
independent expressions of cause and effect. Conse-
quently, changes in energy end-use in global IAMs tend
to be captured at the aggregated sectoral level as a func-
tion of changing incomes and prices (Bauer et al. 2017).
As a result, IAMs are neither designed to explore nor
are useful for exploring the emergence of novelty in
energy end-use. A backward look to 1930 tells us that
it is not science fiction to imagine that portfolios of
mitigation options in 2100 may look very different from
those available today. Yet, peering through an IAM lens
into a distant 2100 world in which warming has been
limited to 1.5 °C, we see short-distance mobility is still
by car, buildings still need heating and cooling, and food
is still grown extensively using land. Consequently,
scenario modelling tells us more about the preoccupa-
tions, beliefs and uncertainties of the present than about
the possibilities of the future (Kramer 2018).
Transformation pathways consistent with 1.5 to 2 °C
mitigation rely heavily on the widespread diffusion of
technologies which are currently available and already
deployed in the market at scale (upper half of Fig. 1).
These are ready substitutes for existing carbon-emitting
or inefficient technologies: wind and solar power for
unabated fossil power; electric and biofuel vehicles for
the internal combustion engine; and energy-efficient
buildings, appliances, lights and industrial processes
for inefficient current practices. The striking anomaly
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is bioCCS, a pre-commercial mitigation option whose
negative emissions are necessary to offset hard-to-
decarbonise activity in industrial, agricultural and inter-
national freight sectors (UNEP 2017).
This emphasis on commonly-available substitutes
omits a wide range of novel energy-using goods and
services which may diffuse rapidly among consumers
(lower half of Fig. 1). These consumer-facing innova-
tions are a potential means of pushing the speed and
magnitude of emission reductions beyond that shown in
transformation pathways for 1.5 °C mitigation.
In this paper, we ask the following:
Q1. Which consumer-facing innovations may poten-
tially reduce emissions to facilitate transformation
pathways consistent with 1.5 °C mitigation?
Q2. What is the magnitude of potential emission re-
ductions from the widespread adoption of low-
carbon innovations by consumers?
We provide answers to these questions using a com-
bination of methods, including expert workshops and
bottom-up quantifications using observational data from
early-adopting niches. Before presenting our methods
and findings, we first explain our use of ‘disruptive low-
carbon innovation’ (DLCI) as an analytical framework
for identifying consumer-facing innovations with the
potential to reduce emissions.
Analytical framework: disruptive low-carbon
innovations (DLCIs)
‘Disruptive innovation’ provides a useful framing for
how consumers can reshape the way firms and markets
provide goods and services. The term originates in
Clayton Christensen’s 1997 book, ‘The Innovator’s Di-
lemma’ (Christensen 1997). This has since been de-
scribed as one of the top six most influential business
books ever written (The Economist 2011). According to
Christensen, disruptive innovations are remarkable for
being uncompetitive on conventional attributes of price,
reliability and performance valued by mainstream con-
sumers. Rather, they offer potential adopters a wholly
new set of attributes. If successful, they effectively
create a new market with a new set of demands and
preferences. In the process, they disrupt the business
models of incumbent firms. Christensen uses the
Fig. 1 Commercial maturity of mitigation options in global IAMs
and disruptive low-carbon innovations. Coloured bands in upper
half of figure show commercial maturity of mitigation options
analysed in Global IAMs for 1.5 °C mitigation (Rogelj et al.
2015; Luderer et al. 2016). Coloured bands in lower half of figure
show commercial maturity of potentially disruptive consumer-
facing low-carbon innovations (see text for details). Left-to-right
scale at top of figure overlays the technology readiness level (TRL)
framework used to assess the commercial maturity of new technol-
ogies (EC 2017) onto a simple staged model of the technology
lifecycle from basic research to diffusion (Wilson and Grubler
2014). The exponential and materiality stages describe initially
rapid and subsequently linear market growth (Kramer and Haigh
2009). Timescales shown in grey arrows are based on empirical
research (Bento and Wilson 2016) but are indicative only as they
generalise across diverse samples of energy technologies
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microcomputer disrupting the mainframe computing
industry in the late 1970s as a canonical example. Main-
frame users valued processing speed, storage capacity,
cost per MB, reliability. Microcomputers performed
poorly on all these attributes. But, the novelty of the
microcomputer’s portability, versatility and low unit
cost enfranchised a whole new market segment—indi-
viduals, households and small firms (Christensen 1997).
The resulting transformative effect is history.1
There are many other elements of Christensen’s dis-
ruptive innovation theory and its subsequent interpreta-
tion and application (Christensen 1997; Govindarajan
and Kopalle 2006; Lambert 2014). In this article, we are
interested specifically in the emphasis placed on novel
attributes offering distinctive value propositions to con-
sumers. These value propositions typically combine
both technological and business model innovations,
and encompass both low-end and high-end goods and
services as well as both low-tech and high-tech sources
of novelty (Table 1).2
Applying disruptive innovation concepts to 1.5 °C
mitigation means also factoring in potential emission
reductions resulting from widespread adoption. Dis-
ruptive low-carbon innovations (DLCIs) therefore
combine an emphasis on private benefits for con-
sumers (novel attributes and value) with social ben-
efits or public goods (lower emissions) (Wilson
2018). This public-goods characteristic is an
important distinction from usual applications of dis-
ruptive innovation. It points to the supporting role of
public policy or other mechanisms for incentivising
low-carbon innovation among private firms. It al-
so shifts the object of disruption from incumbent
firms and markets to the high-carbon practices and
their associated service providers in mainstream mar-
kets (Table 1).
In sum, for the purposes of this article, disruptive
low-carbon innovations (DLCIs) are defined as follows:
Technological and business model innovations
which offer novel value propositions to consumers
and which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions if
adopted at scale.
Method
We use three main methods to answer our two research
questions. First, we comprehensively survey peer-
reviewed and grey literature to identify potential DLCIs
(Q1). Second, we elicit perceptions of low-carbon inno-
vators and researchers during two expert workshops
(Q1, Q2). Third, we identify early adopters of select
DLCIs and ‘scale-up’ observed emission reductions to
matched segments of the UK population. This provides
first-order estimates of mitigation potentials (Q2).
Literature survey of potential DLCIs
We surveyed a wide range of literature on low-carbon
innovation and energy-system transformation to identify
potential DLCIs. Our survey encompassed modelling
analysis of 1.5 to 2 °C mitigation, bottom-up sectoral
analyses, innovation case-studies, news reports, blogs
and magazine articles. We sought specific mentions of
the terms ‘disruptive’, ‘game-changing’, ‘break-
through’, ‘radical’ used in reference to energy, carbon,
or climate change-related innovations.
Examples of literature we surveyed include the
following:
& Market surveys: e.g. (McKinsey 2012, 2013; New
Scientist 2016)
& Innovation strategies: e.g. (HMG 2013; King et al.
2015; WEF 2015; BEIS 2017a; Innovation 2017;
King 2017b)
1 Other examples of disruptive innovation according to Christensen
include desktop photocopiers vs. giant Xerox copy machines; digital
photography vs. film; mobile telephones vs. landline services; small
off-road motorcycles (e.g. Honda) vs. large powerful bikes (e.g. Har-
ley); transistors vs. vacuum tubes; discount retailing vs. department
stores; drones vs. bombers; Wikipedia vs. Encyclopaedia Britannica;
massive open online courses (MOOCs) vs. university degrees; and
outpatient and in-home clinics vs. general hospitals. In each case,
disruptive innovations enter the market as ‘good enough’ alternatives
which offer something novel to an under-served market segment.
2 Christensen defined disruptive innovations as low-end, low-tech
goods and services attractive to users marginalised by mainstream
goods and services. This has since been challenged by a ‘Silicon
Valley’ argument that disruption can and does also come from above
(Arbib and Seba 2017). High-end and typically high-tech products
with more capabilities and functionality than mainstream alternatives
appeal initially to a price-insensitive or technophile market niche (Seba
2014). But, exponentially declining costs and exponentially improving
performance mean that these high-end products rapidly outcompete
incumbents andmovemainstream. It is important to note that including
high-tech products blurs the distinction between Christensen’s empha-
sis on disruptive innovations whose challenge is primarily one of
finding markets and users, and the more familiar dichotomy in the
innovation literature between radical and incremental innovations
which describes the extent of technological advancement or break-
through (Wilson and Grubler 2014).
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& Energy and climate scenarios and modelling: e.g.
(Johansson et al. 2012; Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj
et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2016)
& Research and policy studies: e.g. (The Climate
Group 2013; EC 2015; House of Commons 2016;
Moore 2016; Sussams and Heaton 2017)
& Strategy and advisory reports: e.g. (Seba 2014;
WBCSD 2016; Arbib and Seba 2017)
& Sectoral studies: e.g. (FAO 2013; Breakthrough
Institute 2015; ITF 2015, 2016; King 2017a;
Midttun and Piccini 2017)
& Institutional websites, reports and blogs: e.g. Rocky
Mountain Institute (blog.rmi.org), Climate-KIC
(www.climate-kic.org)
& Peer-reviewed research studies: e.g. (Tyfield and Jin
2010; Tyfield et al. 2010; Dixon et al. 2014; Ruan
et al. 2014; Hang et al. 2015; Dotsika and Watkins
2017)
We used convenience and snowball sampling of
diverse sources, rather than a systematic literature
review based on pre-defined search terms applied to
pre-identified databases. This was for two reasons.
First, ‘disruption’ and disruptive innovation are slip-
pery, inconsistently defined terms (Wilson 2018;
Wilson and Tyfield 2018). Second, online content
from commentators, think tanks and industry ob-
servers are important sources in this fast moving
field. Given this methodological preference, we can-
not and do not claim that the potential DLCIs iden-
tified are exhaustive. However, we did find evidence
of sampling saturation as additional search effort
tended to yield variants of already-identified inno-
vations rather than new ones.
A final set of 99 potential DLCIs identified from the
literature is provided in Table SI-1 (online Supporting
Information), organised into four domains: mobility,
food, buildings and cities, and energy supply and
distribution.
We then screened this full set of DLCIs for
those which clearly offer novel value propositions
for consumers in line with our definition of DLCIs
set out above (see also Table 1). We distinguished
the following:
& Forty-two innovations which relate to end-use
goods and services (downstream, consumer-facing)
& Forty-six innovations which relate to production,
supply chains or markets (upstream, business-
facing)
& Eleven meta-innovations which are cross-cutting,
enabling or embodied in either downstream or up-
stream innovations.
These three groups are shown in full in Table SI-1.
Our analysis and results focus only on the 42 potential
Table 1 Characteristics of disruptive low-carbon innovations. ✔✔ = strongly emphasised; ✔ = emphasised; – = not emphasised. Source:
adapted from Wilson (2018)
Disruptive innovation Disruptive low-carbon
innovation (DLCIs)
Novel application of knowledge (i.e. innovation) ✔✔ ✔✔
Initially attractive in a market niche then performance improves ✔✔ ✔
Disrupts incumbent firms and markets ✔✔ ✔
Combines technological and business model innovation to create value ✔✔ ✔✔
Offers novel product or service attributes to consumers or end-users ✔ ✔✔
Appeals to low-end market and price-sensitive users or non-users ✔✔a ✔
Simple, low-tech alternatives to over-performing mainstream goods ✔✔a ✔
Appeals to high-end market and price-insensitive technophile users ✔✔b ✔
Radical technological breakthroughs which improve exponentially ✔✔b ✔
Reduces greenhouse gas emissions if adopted at scale – ✔✔
Disrupts high-carbon practices, and associated infrastructures and firms – ✔✔
Requires supportive policy or regulatory environment – ✔
a Christensen’s original definition of disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997; Govindarajan and Kopalle 2006; Lambert 2014)
b Silicon Valley ‘addition’ to Christensen’s concepts (Seba 2014; Arbib and Seba 2017)
Energy Efficiency
DLCIs which are clearly consumer-facing. The literature
search and subsequent screening are therefore consistent
with the four key elements of DLCIs as defined above:
technological and business model innovations, novel
value propositions, consumer-facing, and potential to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions if adopted at scale.
Expert perceptions of potential DLCIs
We held two workshops in London in March 2017 to
explore the potential contribution of disruptive innova-
tion to reducing carbon emissions. The workshops were
organised by Future Earth and the Tyndall Centre, with
financial support from the UK Science & Innovation
Network. The first workshop focused on innovations
and markets, bringing together firms, investors, market
intermediaries and policymakers. The second workshop
focused on research needs and challenges, bringing
together thinkers and researchers working on disruption,
system transformation and innovation. A full report of
the workshops including all key findings is available at
silci.org and in Wilson (2017).
Low-carbon innovation experts participating in the
workshops were sent a short pre-workshop survey to
elicit their perceptions of DLCIs in terms of both dis-
ruptiveness and emission reductions. A total of 32 (of
40) participants from the innovator workshop and 24 (of
35) participants from the researcher workshop complet-
ed the survey (response rates of 80 and 63%, respective-
ly). Average survey completion time was 4 min. This is
a small sample size and provides illustrative results only.
The survey asked respondents to select their domain
of greatest expertise: mobility, food, buildings and cit-
ies, energy supply and distribution. In their selected
domain, respondents were asked to score a set of 10
low-carbon innovations on two 7-point scales: potential
disruptiveness (+ 3 = very disruptive, − 3 = not disrup-
tive at all) and potential emission reductions (+ 3 = large
reduction in emissions, − 3 = large increase in emis-
sions). The sets of 10 innovations in each of the four
domains were based on the literature survey, mainly
focusing on consumer-facing innovations but with some
upstream supply-chain and production innovations in-
cluded for comparison purposes.
Scaling-up emission reductions from early adopters
Potential DLCIs are by definition not yet mainstream.
Empirical evidence of their impact on emissions is
therefore limited. In the absence of measurable effects,
either prospective modelling or case-study analysis is an
alternative for quantifying impacts. We use the second
approach, based on evidence of how DLCIs have im-
pacted behaviour, energy use and emissions in early-
adopting market niches.
We drew on the approach used by Dietz et al. (2009)
who quantified ‘realistically achievable emission reduc-
tions’ from a range of household actions in the USA,
based on a scaling-up of best practice from observed
trials, programmes and initiatives. Our analogous meth-
odology comprised four steps:
1. Identify an early-adopting or pioneer niche of a
DLCI
2. Quantify annual reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions as a result of adoption, based on evidence of
observed changes in behaviour and/or energy end-
use
3. Match early-adopting niche to corresponding seg-
ment of the UK population using relevant socio-de-
mographic, geographic or contextual characteristics
4. Estimate potential annual reductions in UK green-
house gas emissions if early-adopting niche was
scaled up to the UK population
Steps (1) and (2) are based on actual (observed)
change in real-world settings. Steps (3) and (4) are a
hypothetical scaling-up exercise which asks: What
would be the impact on emissions if all those in the
UK population with similar characteristics to actual
early adopters also adopted the DLCI?
The UK is a useful case-study country as long-term
emission-reduction targets in line with 2 °C mitigation
are enshrined in UK law through the Climate Change Act
(BEIS 2017b). The incremental challenge for moving
from a 2 °C to 1.5 °C mitigation pathway has not yet
been formally defined by the UK government. However,
modelling analysis confirms the basic intuition that much
stronger mitigation efforts are needed than those current-
ly prescribed by policy (Pye et al. 2017; UK CCC 2017).
Results
Potential disruptive low-carbon innovations (DLCIs)
The potential DLCIs identified in the literature survey
were grouped and organised into a final set of 99
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technological and/or business model innovations shown
in full in Table SI-1 (online Supporting Information).
They vary widely in their specificity, application, tech-
nological radicalness, cost and accessibility. But, several
underlying themes are clear.
Everyday life is being digitalised (Røpke et al. 2010).
Exponential cost reductions show few signs of saturat-
ing in small-scale, low unit cost, modular technologies
from PV panels and batteries to chips and sensors
(Farmer and Lafond 2016). Digital-enabling of peer-
to-peer and other sharing-economy platforms are raising
‘usership’ as an alternative to single-purpose ownership
(Frenken 2017). Traditionally centralised energy infra-
structures and utility service providers are being eroded
away at the edges (Fares and Webber 2017). Transpor-
tation and electricity systems are also converging as
electrons and bits are entering the historical realm of
hydrocarbons (Freeman et al. 2017). Passive energy
consumers are diversifying into multifarious roles of
producer, citizen, activist, designer, community member
and advocate (Schot et al. 2016). These trends towards
more digital, granular, use-based models of energy-
service provision are opening up new value propositions
for consumers with potential benefits for emission
reductions.
Mobility
Table 2 shows the consumer-facing DLCIs identified as
relating to mobility, grouped into four broad types:
alternative fuel or vehicle technologies displacing the
internal combustion engine (ICE), alternative forms of
auto-mobility displacing private car ownership and use,
alternatives to auto-mobility displacing car use, and
reduced demand for mobility. All four strategies target
private ownership and use of petrol or diesel-powered
ICE vehicles. Most of the potential DLCIs in Table 2 are
defined by some combination of business model and
technological innovation.
Table 2 is not a comprehensive set of innovations for
reducing mobility-related emissions. It summarises only
those identified in the literature survey which are con-
sistent with our definition of DLCIs in offering novel
value propositions to consumers. Some consumer-
facing innovations are excluded because either they
are not novel or they compete on already-valued main-
stream attributes including price, efficiency and reliabil-
ity (e.g. fuel-efficient cars). There are also a whole host
of non-consumer-facing strategies which rely more
directly on regulation (e.g. fuel taxes), infrastructure
(e.g. cycle highways) or planning (e.g. car-free commu-
nities). Some of these are captured in Table SI-1 (online
Supporting Information).
The impact of potential DLCIs on energy end-use
and so emissions depends on the emission profile of the
incumbent good or service being displaced. Table 2
links each potential DLCI with the higher-carbon in-
cumbent which currently dominates mainstream con-
sumption. This is indicative only; what DLCIs actually
displace will vary by context and adopter segment. As
an example, alternative forms of auto-mobility may
displace private car ownership and use, or may substi-
tute for public transport and active modes (Sprei 2018).
Displacement of incumbents is therefore set against a
dynamic and variegated background of changing tech-
nologies, users and markets, which are themselves po-
tentially shaped by disruptive innovation (McDowall
2018; Tyfield 2018).
Each potential DLCI identified varies in the novel
attributes of potential appeal to consumers. Some are
goods with high investment costs; others are use-based
services. Some preserve individual or household-scale
autonomy and independence; others tie users into rela-
tional networks. Alternative forms of auto-mobility such
as car clubs clearly diverge from the incumbent model of
private car ownership and use. So too do alternatives to
auto-mobility such as mobility-as-a-service. These poten-
tial DLCIs offer novel value propositions based around
service consumption (or usership), pay-per-use, choice
variety, flexibility and freedom from maintenance and
care responsibilities (Prettenhaler and Steininger 1999).
In contrast alternative vehicle technologies sustain the
incumbent model of auto-mobility but with lower emis-
sions. Apart from being cleaner, the novel attributes for
consumers are less clear. As an example, biofuel vehicles
are a broadly like-for-like substitute for ICE vehicles in
terms of their driving, maintenance and functional char-
acteristics (Ribeiro et al. 2012). However, both biofuel,
fuel cell and electric vehicles—while reinforcing prevail-
ing norms on private car ownership and use—offer low
or zero emission alternatives to ICEs, while also being
consistent with green identity and associated status sig-
nalling (Axsen and Kurani 2013).
Food
Table 3 shows the consumer-facing DLCIs related to
food identified by the literature search, together with the
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mainstream higher-carbon practice they typically dis-
place (which determines their potential impact on emis-
sions). The DLCIs are grouped into four broad types:
alternative dietary preferences reducing demand for
livestock production; urban food production displacing
large-scale, extensive rural food production and associ-
ated food miles; producer-consumer relationships
displacing impersonal centralised retail (including su-
permarkets); and reduced demand for food by tackling
food waste.
As with mobility, these DLCIs are identified in the
literature as potentially contributing to emission reduc-
tions by displacing or substituting for energy-intensive
food production, distribution and waste. Realistically
achievable emission reductions in real-world contexts
require careful empirical analysis and will vary across
adopters and contexts. In the food domain, this implies
lifecycle or system analysis to link changes in consump-
tion with agricultural practices upstream (Springmann
et al. 2016).
Some of the potential food-related DLCIs in Table 3
may not seem overly new. Examples include reduced
meat in diet, community farms and own-food growing.
They are included in Table 3 because of novel applica-
tions of digital technologies in business models which
create, enable or incentivise new consumer practices. For
example, ‘Part-Time Carnivore’ and ‘The Climatarian
Challenge’ gamify low-carbon diets through apps which
record, connect and challenge user practices.
Other potential DLCIs in Table 3 characterise less
carbon-intensive forms of food production which are
not evidently consumer-facing. Examples include verti-
cal farming, rooftop greenhouses and food link schemes.
They are included in Table 3 because they introduce,
bring closer or strengthen direct links or relationships
between producers and consumers. Again, this is often
enabled by digital technologies. For example, online
producer-consumer hubs such as ‘Farmdrop’ or ‘Open
Food Network UK’ serve as digital marketplaces
allowing consumers to buy directly from multiple pro-
ducers subject to pre-specified dietary preferences, nutri-
tional requirements, production techniques or location.
There are many other innovations and strategies for
reducing emissions through alternative farming and
Table 2 Consumer-facing innovations relating to mobility which can potentially reduce emissions. • = included in survey of experts; x =
included in scaling-up methodology for estimating emission reductions (see text for details)
Potentially disruptive low-carbon innovation (DLCI) Higher-carbon incumbent Survey Scaling-up
Alternative fuel or vehicle technologies Electric vehicles (EVs) ICE vehiclesa •
Autonomous vehicles •
Fuel cell vehicles (H2FCVs) •
Biofuel or flex-fuel vehicles •
Alternative forms of auto-mobility Car clubs (car-sharing) Car ownership and useb • x
Ride-sharing •
Shared taxis or ‘taxi-buses’c
Neighbourhood electric vehiclesd
Alternatives to auto-mobility e-Bikes Car ownership and useb • x
Mobility-as-a-service (MaaS)e • x
Reduced demand for mobility Telecommuting Commuting by car •
Interactive virtual reality, telepresencef
a ICE = petrol or diesel-powered internal combustion engines
b Indicative only, displaced transport mode may by public transport or active modes (see text for discussion)
c Shared taxis or ‘taxi-buses’ (also real-time ride-sharing) are cars or minivans with multiple passengers on similar routes, booked on short
notice via apps so wait times are short
dNeighbourhood electric vehicles (NEVs) are light-weight low-speed battery-driven vehicles allowed on roads (HBR 2015)
eMobility-as-a-service (also inter-modality) refers to app-based scheduling, booking and payment systems for multiple transport modes
(ride-sharing, bike-sharing, bus, tram, metro, train) through a single gateway or account (ITF 2016)
f Interactive virtual reality or telepresence can be used for immersive interaction by remote (as currently used in medical diagnosis or
surgery) (Roby 2014)
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land-use practices which are not included in Table 3 as
they do not clearly offer novel value propositions to
consumers (see column headed ‘upstream’ in Table SI-
1). These alternative farming practices range from sus-
tainable intensification, precision ‘smart’ agriculture
and agroforestry to aquaculture and greenhouse hydro-
ponic systems (FAO 2013).
As is often the case with disruptive innovations, many
of the food-related DLCIs perform poorly on valued
mainstream attributes such as year-round availability,
standardisation, cheapness, and one-stop shop availabil-
ity (at centralised retailers). However, they offer new
sources of value across many different attributes, creating
opportunities for consumers to express preferences for
healthier, localised, personalised, interconnected food
systems. In some cases, defined market niches are well
established, and the DLCIs are less reliant on technolog-
ical innovation than is the case for mobility.
Buildings
Table 4 shows the consumer-facing DLCIs related to
buildings identified in the literature search. They are
grouped into three broad types: interconnectivity for
optimised usage of devices, appliances, homes; improved
thermal performance through alternative heating technol-
ogies, improved building design and construction, or en-
ergy management; and reduced demand for space and
materials through sharing of surplus or shareable capacity.
Many of these are in turn enabled by urban-scale
innovations which either collect and analyse data to
improve system integration and performance (under the
rubric of ‘smart cities’) or which improve upon design,
construction and planning practices (e.g. construction of
Passivhaus or net zero energy buildings). These upstream
innovations relating more to infrastructure and cities are
included in Table SI-1 but are excluded here as they do
not directly offer novel value propositions to consumers.
Of the potential DLCIs identified across four do-
mains, those relating to buildings were the least clear
in offering novel and appealing value propositions.
Control and controllability are the main new attributes
promised. By integrating digital interfaces and connec-
tivity into smart appliances, heating, lighting and home
energy management systems, building users have a
wider range of potential control functionality (including
automation, adaptive learning and user-defined rou-
tines). But, it remains unclear if this control functionality
Table 3 Consumer-facing innovations relating to food which can potentially reduce emissions. • = included in survey of experts; x =
included in scaling-up methodology for estimating emission reductions (see text for details)
Potentially disruptive low-carbon innovation (DLCI) Higher-carbon incumbent Survey Scaling-up
Alternative dietary preferences Reduced meat dieta Livestock production • x
Cultured meatb
Urban food production Community farms, own-food growing Land- and/or resource-intensive food
production and transportation
• x
Vertical farmingc
Rooftop greenhousesd x
Producer-consumer relationships Food box deliveriese Food transportation, food waste
Food links schemesf
Reduced demand for food Food redistribution or sharingg Food waste
Food waste reductionh x
a Includes any dietary preferences which reduce meat consumption, from meat-free Fridays to veganism or insect-based protein
bCultured meat is animal meat that is grown using a bioreactor (Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos 2011)
cVertical farming includes stacked modular food pods with self-contained hydroponic growing mediums
dRooftop greenhouses can use waste heat (and CO2) from buildings’ heating and ventilation systems to boost productivity (Vogel 2008)
eFood box deliveries bring regular door-to-door selections of fresh produce, which may be tailored to specific recipes, reducing waste and
transport requirements for food retail (Hertz and Halkier 2017)
fFood links schemes connect producers directly with consumers including through digital marketplaces to reduce waste, improve supply-
chain transparency and support specific production methods
gFood redistribution or sharing schemes link local retailers (or consumers) with surplus food to charities (or consumers) needing food
(Aschemann-Witzel et al. 2017)
hFood waste reduction includes schemes in self-service food outlets to reduce portion size (Perchard 2016)
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is appealing, useable, and emissions-reducing
(Hargreaves and Wilson 2017). These same innovations
also tend to reduce users’ autonomy by increasing the
dependence of building management and performance
on external service providers and infrastructures.
Energy supply and distribution
Table 5 shows the consumer-facing DLCIs related to
energy supply and distribution, together with the higher-
carbon incumbent they may displace. This domain is
explicitly about technological and business model inno-
vations at the interface between end-use and supply.
The DLCIs are grouped into three broad types: new
service providers or market entrants with novel service
offerings for end users; integrating consumers into grids
increases the demand-responsiveness of end-users to
grid constraints (e.g. for avoiding costly or high-
carbon peak generation); and decentralised energy sup-
ply includes both technologies (e.g. solar PV + storage)
and organisational forms of service provision (e.g. com-
munity energy).
There are a host of other resources and technologies
for decarbonising the energy supply (e.g. offshore wind,
nuclear reactors) as well as enabling infrastructures (e.g.
utility-scale grid storage for balancing intermittent
renewables). As shown in Fig. 1, these upstream innova-
tions are emphasised by global IAMs in transformation
pathways consistent with 1.5 °C mitigation. Although
included in the full list of DLCIs in Table SI-1, they are
excluded here as they do not have clearly distinguishable
consumer-facing attributes. This is particularly the case
for alternative ways of generating or supplying electric-
ity, as this is a homogeneous commodity for consumers.
Energy supply and distribution-related innovations
cluster around value propositions which challenge
centralised networks and utilities. These value proposi-
tions see electricity users in particular diversifying their
roles away from passive consumption towards actively
managing, producing, trading and organising (Schot
et al. 2016). The changing roles of energy end-users
are enabled by digitalisation to enable the integration
and management of diverse small-scale energy re-
sources and rapid cost reductions in household-scale
technologies like solar PV and batteries.
Expert perceptions of potential disruptiveness
and emission reductions
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide a general indication of the
higher-carbon incumbent which potential DLCIs may
displace. Most of these DLCIs are not yet or only
Table 4 Consumer-facing innovations relating to buildings which can potentially reduce emissions. • = included in survey of experts; x =
included in scaling-up methodology for estimating emission reductions (see text for details)
Potentially disruptive low-carbon innovation (DLCI) Higher-carbon incumbent Survey Scaling-up
Interconnectivity for optimised
usage
Smart appliances, internet of
things (IoT)
Energy waste (from limited user control) • x
LED lighting with smart controls •
Smart homes
Improved thermal
performance
Home energy management
systems (HEMS)
Energy waste (from limited user control and
inefficient heating or building systems)
•
Smart heating controls x
Heat pumps •
Pre-fab high-efficiency retrofitsa
Reduced demand for space
and materials
Sharing spaceb Under-used resources •
Sharing products, tools, stuffc,d •
aPre-fab high-efficiency retrofits refers to custom-fitted high-performance building shells combined with solar PV and heat pump units
fabricated off-site and installed externally around properties within a week, an approach pioneered in the Netherlands as Energiesprong
(Jacobs et al. 2015)
b Sharing space includes peer-to-peer networks such as AirBnB
c Sharing products, tools, stuff includes peer-to-peer networks such as Streetbank
d 3D printingwas also identified as a potential consumer-facing DLCI to reduce demand for materials (see Table SI-1), but was omitted here
due to a lack of evidence on its emission-reducing potential (Gebler et al. 2014)
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recently commercialised (lower half of Fig. 1). This
section and the next section present expert perceptions
and what-if estimations of emission-reduction potentials
for subsets of the DLCIs identified in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Low-carbon innovators and researchers participating
in two expert workshops were asked to score sets of
low-carbon innovations along two dimensions: disrup-
tiveness and emission reductions. Figure 2 plots the
mean scores on potential disruptiveness (y-axis) and
potential impact on emissions (x-axis) for innovations
in each of the four domains. The innovations were
drawn from the full set of those identified in the litera-
ture survey and include both consumer-facing DLCIs
(closed circles) as well as select upstream innovations
for comparison purposes (open circles).
The innovations are all clustered in the top right of
the Fig. 2 plots as they were identified from the literature
survey of potential DLCIs. In terms of potential disrup-
tiveness and potential emission-reductions, the top three
consumer-facing DLCIs in each domain are as follows:
& Mobility—mobility-as-a-service, electric vehicles
(EVs), car clubs (car-sharing)
& Buildings—internet of things, home energy manage-
ment systems (HEMS), LED lighting and controls
& Energy supply and distribution—solar PV + stor-
age, demand response, vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
Food-related DLCIs are not included here, as only
two consumer-facing DLCIs were scored in the food
domain by a small number of respondents.
How low-carbon innovators and researchers scored
the potential DLCIs is revealing. First, many innovations
considered by experts to be highly disruptive are either
dependent on technological advances (e.g. internet of
things, smart grids, vertical farming) or do not appear
to offer novel attributes valued by end users (e.g.
artificially-lit greenhouse agriculture, large-scale grid
storage). Potential DLCIs for buildings in particular are
strongly technological (and weakest in terms of business
model innovation). One interpretation is that changes in
energy end-use are most strongly constrained in build-
ings and cities by long-lived existing infrastructures.
Second, various highly-scored potential DLCIs ap-
pear dependent on behavioural change, without a clear
link to technological or business model innovation. This
is most strongly the case for food (e.g. reduced food
waste, reduced meat in diet). However, as noted earlier,
digital technologies are opening up opportunities for
new business models to facilitate innovation in this area.
Table 5 Consumer-facing innovations relating to energy supply and distribution which can potentially reduce emissions. • = included in
survey of experts; x = included in scaling-up methodology for estimating emission reductions (see text for details)
Potentially disruptive low-carbon innovation (DLCI) Higher-carbon incumbent Survey Scaling-up
New service providers Energy service companies (ESCOs) Barriers to low-carbon capital
investment
• n/a
Energy aggregatorsa
Third-party financingb
Integrating consumers into grids Demand response (DR)c Demand unresponsive to needs
of grid
•
Time-of-use pricing
Disaggregated feedbackd
Electric vehicle-to-grid (V2G) •
Decentralised energy supply Community energy Centralised utility-supplied
electricity or gasSolar PV + storage •
Peer-to-peer electricity tradinge •
Micro-wind turbines
Fuel cells for distributed generation + storage
aMunicipal or market intermediaries enable consumers to group together for collective bargaining or low-carbon capital investment
programmes
b For domestic solar PVor energy-efficiency investments, including facade or roof leasing (Seba 2014)
c Utilities remotely curtail electricity-using appliances to reduce peak loads, subject to pre-agreed terms with consumers
d Real-time feedback on electricity loads disaggregated to specific appliances or activities (Stankovic et al. 2016)
e From solar PV + battery systems (Green and Newman 2017), or vehicle-to-grid applications (Freeman et al. 2017)
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Third, potential emission reductions are contingent
on the innovations being adopted at scale in the market,
so should implicitly account for both the size of poten-
tial market demand and the incumbent good or service
being displaced. The relative scorings of potential
DLCIs in the Fig. 2 plots seem more influenced by
proximity to market and current market size than
longer-term transformative potentials. As an example,
autonomous vehicles are scored much lower in potential
emission impact than electric vehicles even though au-
tonomous vehicle studies generally assume electrifica-
tion (Arbib and Seba 2017). However, it is not possible
to infer reliably the extent to which respondents were
accounting for displaced goods or services when scoring
particular DLCIs.
Quantification of emission-reduction potentials
Results from the expert survey are consistent with the
literature in identifying emission-reduction potentials
from DLCIs. Quantitative estimates of the magnitude
of these emission reductions need to account for both
market growth potential and the displacement of higher-
carbon incumbents. We developed and applied a
standardised methodology to quantify potential emis-
sion reductions from a sample of DLCIs using the UK
Fig. 2 Mean scores from a survey of experts on perceived
disruptiveness and emission reduction potentials for low-
carbon innovations. Closed circles denote consumer-facing
innovations (see text for details). Open circles denote upstream
innovations included for comparison purposes but not
analysed further (see Table SI-1)
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as a case study.We relied to the extent possible on actual
observations of energy or emission reductions among
early adopters. We then scaled up this evidence base to
the UK population based on matched sample
characteristics.
Taking urban farming as an example, we identified a
community farm in Sutton (an urban district in London)
as an early adopter. A detailed lifecycle analysis quan-
tified emission reductions from the farm’s produce at 34
tCO2e per hectare per year, accounting for both
displaced high-input agriculture and avoided food miles
(Kulak et al. 2013). Two hundred ninety-five urban
districts in the UK have equivalent or lower population
density to Sutton (ONS 2015) so could potentially site
comparable community farms. Assuming similar types
and quantities of annual produce, this yields potential
emission reductions of 2.1 MtCO2e per year from
scaling-up Sutton’s precedent to the UK as a whole.
Further details for this example are provided in online
Supporting Information Table SI-2.
We implemented the scaling-up methodology on a
sample of 11 potential DLCIs across the mobility, food
and building domains. These DLCIs were selected, as
behavioural, energy or emissions data were available
from early-adopting niches. Table 6 summarises the
results, with full documentation of assumptions, data
and sources provided in Table SI-2.
Potential emission reductions from 11 DLCIs total ~
2.5% of the UK’s annual emissions from passenger
vehicles, ~ 11% of the UK’s annual emissions from
agriculture and ~ 2% of annual emissions from homes.
These estimates for the UK from a select set of 11
DLCIs are a first-order (back of the envelope) indication
of potential emission reductions based on observations
of what actually happens to energy and food demand
when consumers adopt DLCIs. The main assumption is
that the DLCIs scale up from existing early-adopting
niches to the UK as a whole, but only within the popu-
lation segments matched to early adopters. This is a
conservative assumption. There is strong evidence from
diffusion research that later-adopting population seg-
ments are initially risk averse but becomemore attracted
to innovations as they learn from the experience of early
adopters (Rogers 2003). As a result, the characteristics
of adopters diversify as the innovation becomes more
widespread.
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 set out 31 additional DLCIs to the
11 analysed in Table 6. Further research is needed to
quantify their contribution to 1.5 °C mitigation. How-
ever, there are prospective modelling studies which
confirm significant potential emission reductions. Ex-
amples in each domain include the following:
& Mobility. The International Transport Forum (ITF)
evaluated city-scale impacts of new forms of mobil-
ity using an agent-based simulation model of Lis-
bon, Portugal, based on real mobility and network
data. They found that a combination of shared taxis
Table 6 Potential reductions in annual emissions if 11 DLCIs
were to scale up from early-adopting niches to matched segments
of the UK population. See Table SI-2 for assumptions, data and
sources. UK emissions data by sector for 2015 include both direct
and indirect (upstream) emissions from territorial or production-
based emission inventories (BEIS 2017c)
Domain Potential DLCI Annual emission reductions from scaling-up evidence from early-adopting niches to matched
UK population
As MtCO2e As % of UK territorial emissions in corresponding sector in 2015
Mobility Car clubs 0.8 to 0.9 0.8 to 0.9% Of direct and indirect emissions from passenger
and light duty vehicles (96.8 MtCO2e)E-bikes
E-bike sharing
0.04 to 0.08 0.04 to 0.08%
0.09 0.09%
Mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) 1.4 1.4%
Food Cultured meat 0.02 0.03% Of direct and indirect emissions from agriculture
(51.1 MtCO2e)Food waste reduction 2.6 to 3.6 5.2 to 7.1%
Urban farming 2.1 4.1%
Rooftop greenhouses 0.04 to 0.6 0.1 to 1.2%
Reduced meat diet 0.7 1.4%
Buildings Smart heating controls 1.4 to 2.6 1.2 to 2.3% Of direct and indirect emissions from homes
(112.1 MtCO2e)Smart appliance (fridge) 0.1 0.1%
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and taxi-buses (30 min pre-book, flexible route)
could use 3% of the existing car fleet to provide a
flexible, cheap, available, comfortable alternative to
private vehicle ownership and use, reducing CO2
emissions by 34% and congestion to close to zero
(ITF 2016). A separate study found that a fleet of
shared autonomous vehicles comprising multiple
passenger ‘Taxibots’ and single passenger
‘Autovots’ could use 10–20% of the existing vehicle
fleet to provide a viable alternative to both private
cars and buses, with commensurate benefits for
freed-up road infrastructure (ITF 2015).
& Food. Lifecycle analysis of the environmental im-
pacts of cultured meat grown in a bioreactor esti-
mated 7–45% lower energy use and 78–96% lower
greenhouse gas emissions (including methane) rela-
tive to conventionally produced meat in Europe
(Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos 2011).
& Buildings. Shifting or curtailing energy use through
demand response to utilities’ price signals while
accounting for household comfort found that home
energy management systems (HEMS) could reduce
electricity costs by 23% and peak demand by 30%
with corresponding reductions in emissions
(Beaudin and Zareipour 2015).
Discussion
Global IAMs are useful analytical tools linking trans-
formation pathways to warming outcomes consistent
with the 1.5 °C ambition of the Paris Agreement. How-
ever, IAMs have important limitations in their ability to
analyse the emergence of novel consumer-facing goods
and services. Bottom-up, sectoral, case study analysis
provides complementary insights to top-down global
modelling on the rapid and pervasive emission reduc-
tions needed for 1.5 °C mitigation.
Disruptive innovations are pulled into mainstream
markets by the attractiveness and novelty of their value
proposition for consumers. Disruptive low-carbon inno-
vations (DLCIs) represent an underexplored dimension
of 1.5 °C mitigation pathways which require ever-
greater emphasis on demand-side emission reductions
(Rogelj et al. 2015; Luderer et al. 2016).
This paper presents an initial analysis of consumer-
facing DLCIs and their potential to reduce emissions.
We asked (Q1): which consumer-facing innovations
may potentially reduce emissions to facilitate transfor-
mation pathways consistent with 1.5 °C mitigation?
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 identify a wide range of
consumer-facing DLCIs which can displace higher-
carbon practices. Some of these DLCIs are built on
business model innovations (e.g. car clubs, energy ser-
vice companies); others rely on technological break-
throughs (e.g. cultured meat, autonomous vehicles).
Many potential DLCIs combine traditional energy-
using hardware with digital platforms or controls (e.g.
peer-to-peer electricity trading from domestic PV with
battery storage).
In general, the DLCIs identified are more distributed,
accessible, small-scale, shareable, and extendable or
replicable at low marginal cost relative to the incum-
bents they displace. In other words, DLCIs tend to offer
user-scaled alternatives to large-scale, infrastructure-de-
pendent, centrally provided goods and services. In a
low-carbon context, this points towards a ‘granular’
distributed energy transformation involving end-users
in multiple domains and services from heating and
eating to moving and making.
The appeal of DLCIs to consumers is centred around
novel attributes. The attractiveness of these attributes
will help determine the speed of diffusion into niche
and then mainstream markets. Consumer preferences
are likely to vary strongly between adopter segments,
whereas early adopters may be price-insensitive and
attracted to new functionality, identity signalling or sta-
tus distinctions, and more mainstream consumers are
typically concerned with price, reliability and compati-
bility (Rogers 2003). Diffusion out of early-adopting
niches is far from certain.
Yet, this diffusion is a determinant of the relevance of
DLCIs for 1.5 °C mitigation. We asked (Q2): what is the
magnitude of potential emission reductions from the
widespread adoption of low-carbon innovations by
consumers?
Actual emission reductions from DLCI adoption de-
pend on what is being displaced. As by definition,
DLCIs are not yet mainstream, and careful in situ studies
of early-adopting niches are needed to quantify changes
in behaviour, energy use and resulting emissions. These
should account for both the socioeconomic and lifestyle
characteristics of the adopters, contextual conditions
shaping adoption (e.g. policies, infrastructures, incen-
tives), as well as any observed rebound effects. As
examples, car sharing may substitute for car ownership
and use, or may complement it as a flexible ‘second car’
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option; mobility-as-a-service (MaaS) may move people
onto public transit by weaving seamless intermodal
connections or may result in taxis substituting for active
travel modes for the final legs of journeys (Sprei 2018).
In the absence of robust evidence from market be-
haviour, we drew on expert perceptions, innovation-
specific quantifications, and literature review to charac-
terise emission-reduction potentials. These potentials
are contingent on DLCIs displacing carbon-intensive
modes of energy-service provision ranging from private
car ownership and use, large-scale food production and
distribution, inefficient building design and perfor-
mance, and centralised energy-supply networks.
As well as directly reducing emissions by displacing
higher-carbon practices, DLCIs also have an indirect
effect. Disruptive innovations are typically brought to
market by new entrants who challenge mainstream ser-
vice providers. The political economic power and vested
interests of incumbent firms, particularly those with
interests in fossil fuels, are considered a major source
of stability or ‘carbon lock-in’ in current systems (Unruh
2000; Seto et al. 2016). Consumers attracted to DLCIs
can undermine the business models on which this sta-
bility rests. This is already evident in the ‘edge-of-the-
grid’ threats to conventional energy utilities from
decentralised energy resources (Wainstein and Bumpus
2016). Incumbent firms may of course co-opt or adapt to
disruptive threats. But, these defensive responses pre-
sage wider system transformation. This is an important
area for further research. Whether it is appropriate or
relevant to view this transformative potential through
the lens of discrete innovations is open to debate. This
debate is clearly evidenced by 10 contrasting perspec-
tives on ‘Disruptive Innovation and Energy Transfor-
mation’ in a recent Special Issue (Geels 2018; Wilson
and Tyfield 2018).
Conclusion
Limiting warming to 1.5 °C requires concerted innova-
tion throughout the global system of producing, distrib-
uting and using energy (Grubler and Wilson 2014).
Consumers and consumption are commonly framed as
part of the problem. Consumption is energy (and mate-
rial) intensive and expands in lockstep with income
(Sorrell 2015). Consumers are addicted and profligate
(Costanza et al. 2017). Yet, consumption also has trans-
formative potential. Disruptive innovation is a lens
through which to examine this transformative potential
of novel goods and services. Disruptive low-carbon
innovations (DLCIs) combine business models and
technologies to create appealing value propositions for
consumers. This can engage consumers in efforts to
reduce emissions. DLCIs are therefore an important lens
through which to examine 1.5 °Cmitigation. They focus
attention on consumers as possible agents of transfor-
mative change both directly by displacing carbon-
intensive goods and services, and indirectly by
dislodging incumbent firms.
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